• The Struggle For A Permanent Seat At The Security Council: A Critical Assessment Of The Contestants In 2012

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    • 1.5       LITERATURE REVIEW
      This review focused primarily on those documents and commentators that comments and contributes to the on-going debate on the reformation, reorganisation and expansion of the United Nations Organisation especially as it relates to the call to reform United Nations Security Council both in composition, representation and in voting pattern because the use of Veto by a select few is causing disquiet among the rest of the world.
      The Politics of Veto in United Nations Security Council (Uses and Abuses of Veto Power)
      One of the most distinctive features of the UNSC is that it is the only U.N organ in which there is a formal rule of unanimity or ‘right of veto’. The UNSC is part parliament and part secret diplomatic conclave. As Beigbeder (1994:18) asserts, “the Charter declares that decisions of the Council shall be by the affirmative vote of nine members and that, except for procedural matters, the votes shall include the concurring votes of the permanent members”. The only exception to this Charter rule is that in decisions relating to the pacific settlement of disputes, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. Thus, if nine or more of the 15 members vote in favor of a proposal but one of the five permanent members votes `no’, the proposal will be nullified. The UNSC can veto virtually any decision including the proposals by the UNGA as a whole. A closer analysis however, reveals that there is no reference in the U.N Charter to the ‘right of veto’. What is called the ‘right of veto’ is intrinsically linked to permanent membership. Article 27 (3) of the U.N Charter merely calls for the ‘concurring votes’ of the permanent members when the UNSC takes substantive decision.
      The model on which the U.N was built has been proved to be too ambitious. The U.N Charter had been drafted on the assumption that the victors of the WWII would continue to co-operate as they did during the hostilities. Paradoxically, from the beginning, the U.N had been unable to function as designed. The working of the UNSC, a body designed to ensure the strong beat of the heart of the U.N Charter and its collective security provisions has over the years attracted widespread criticism. Instead of fostering co-operation, it became apparent in the early days of the U.N that the Post-War differences that had developed between the U.S and the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) significantly limited the ability of the UNSC to take action. As Chopra (2001:42) argues, “The superpowers were inevitably on opposite sides of most issues and the U.S controlled the votes in the council”. The USSR’s interests being frequently threatened, and because of its conspicuous minority position in the UNSC, it was left with the veto as its sole weapon within the U.N machinery to thwart any action it considered injurious to its interests.
      Since the U.N originated from a coalition of victorious wartime allies, “the organization faced for roughly several decades questioning on how those ‘converted’ to the antifascist side of peace might be admitted to the club” (Beigbeder 1984:45). Over the years, vetoes have been cast to block the admission of member states as well as nominations for the U.N Secretary General. As argued by Rourke (2002:34), “Despite all 14 other UNSC members having supported Boutros Boutros Ghali, the U.S veto ended his tenure as the U.N Secretary General”. As the Cold -War evolved, within an economically and ideologically diametrically opposed world, the U.S and the USSR approached this issue of new U.N membership, not from the viewpoint of who sided with whom during the WWII, but rather who sided with whom in the Cold-War.
      Thus, the U.S ensured that USSR allies applying for membership were denied the required UNSC majority. On the USSR side, in a bid to keep out Western- sponsored applicants, it used its veto recurrently (Canton 1986). In the early days of the U.N as Barry (2003:38) argues, “The USSR Commissioner and later Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov said `no’ so many times that he was known as `Mr Veto’.” Vyacheslav Molotov regularly rejected bids for new membership because of the U.S refusal to admit the Soviet republics. This state of affairs led in 1955 to a compromise deal which resulted in the admission of sixteen members of the U.N. As Kegley (1985:128) asserts, “This compromise between the superpowers allowed the great powers to support a politically balanced package of applicants, including pro-Easterners, pro-Westerners, and neutrals”. The compromise deal opened the floodgates and by 1980, the U.N had more than 150 members, roughly three times the original number.
      It is apparent that the U.S and USSR would probably not have accepted the creation of the U.N without the veto power. This is because some exceptional privileges denied to Great Powers in the days of the League of Nations or in other security associations, the veto represents that right which was prerequisite of all sovereign states in the pre-UN world not to be overruled by other members. As Roskin argues:
      Stalin at Yalta in 1945 insisted on the veto provision, Churchill and Roosevelt went along. Stalin felt [correctly] that the USSR would be so outnumbered by non-Communist countries that it would suffer permanent condemnation. On the same basis, Stalin got the bizarre provision giving three UNGA votes to the USSR, whose constituent republics of Ukraine and Beloroussia were counted as U.N members. (Roskin, 1993:362)

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    • ABSRACT - [ Total Page(s): 1 ]This work set out to investigate the struggle for Permanent Seats At The Security Council: A Critical Assessment of the Contestants in 2012. While observing that there exists a fundamental need to reform and enlarge both the membership and voting pattern in the Security Council in order to reflect geopolitical realities of the 21st Century by making both the organisation and the Security Council in particular to appear democratic while at the same time enhancing its efficiency and legitimacy aro ... Continue reading---