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The Us Security Policy And North Korea Nuclear Programme, 2000 – 2008
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background Of study
The posture of
the US foreign and defense policies especially in the post-Cold War era
of international politics has demonstrated blatantly and abundantly a
tendency to seek power, increase power and to demonstrate power
(Morganthau, 1973). More importantly, the 9/11 terrorist attack did
transform the way America government think about their foreign and
defense policies. In fact, there have been remarkable changes in U.S
defense and nuclear weapons policy following the 9/11 terrorist attack.
These changes in U.S nuclear weapon policy were announced in two
official documents that were released by the Bush’s administration in
2002. Both documents, according to Intriligator (2003), were influenced,
in part, by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. The
first of these documents is the U.S Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) issued
by the U.S Department of Defense which expressively states that “A
combination of offensive and defensive and nuclear and non-nuclear
capabilities is essential to meet the deterrence requirements of the
21st century†(cited in Intriligator, 2003:2). The second of these
documents is the National Security Strategy of the United States of
America (NSS). Issued by the Office of the National Security Advisor to
the President in September, 2000, the document reveals that there are
plans to ensure that no nation could rival U.S military strength. It
proclaims the doctrine of U.S preemption, where it “cannot let our
enemies strike first†and gives arguments for preemption. It notes that
for “centuries, international law recognized that nations need not
suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend
themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack.â€
(Intriligator, nd: 2).
Thus, influenced mostly by the latter
document, President George W. Bush, on June 1st, 2002, at West Point,
set forth a new doctrine for U.S security policy. According to him,
The
successful strategies of the cold war era are ill-suited to national
defense in the 21st century. Deterrence means nothing against terrorist
networks; containment will not thwart unbalanced dictators possessing
weapons of mass destruction. We cannot afford to wait until we are
attacked. In today’s circumstances, Americans must be ready to take
‘preemptive action’ to defend our lives and liberties (Galston, 2002:
np).
With this, George W. Bush not only introduced what has since
been widely known as “Bush Doctrineâ€, but has also made it an official
part of U.S policy. Therefore, US defense/strategic policy under George
W. Bush, as aptly described by Falk (2002) implies striking first, not
in a crisis, but on the basis of shadowy intentions, alleged potentials
links to terrorist groups, supposed plans and projects to acquire
weapons of mass destruction, and anticipations of possible future
dangers.
Meanwhile, the US government, even before the 9/11, appeared
to have been committed to unilateral military solution to the problems
of terrorism and acquisition and possible use of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD). Hence, in the aftermath of the 11 September terrorist
attacks, the United States found justification to harass, intimidate,
attack and dethrone regimes suspected of either harboring terrorists,
amassing weapons of mass destruction or colluding with the known
terrorist organizations. These states were variously labeled by the Bush
administration as “terrorist statesâ€, “axis of evilâ€, “rogue statesâ€,
among others and therefore proclaimed its determination to attack “foes
in anticipation of hostile acts†and to carry out these attacks
“unilaterally, presumably without prior authorization from the United
Nations Security Council†(cited in Wirtz and Russel, 2003: 117). True
to its threat, the administration of Bush preemptively and unilaterally
attacked Iraq in 2003, dethroning its leader- Saddam Hussein and
installing another government which is believed to be pliable to the
government on the United States. However, despite the avalanche of
criticisms and condemnations that have trailed the US unilateralism and
hegemonism in the aftermath of the Cold war, the US government,
particularly the administration of George Bush, did maintain
unequivocally that the menace of terrorism as well as the potential
dangers posed by the accumulation and the possible use of Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD) by the “rogue states†has made the resort to
preemption unquestionably desirable.
As for the North Korea, various
diplomatic efforts have been underway, in the last 25 years, to grapple
with the North Korean nuclear issue in terms of whether to prevent North
Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons or to disarm its assumed nuclear
weapons capability. At different times, the instruments to achieve these
objectives have included an international treaty (the NPT), a regional
nuclear-free zone (the NSDD) and a bilateral agreement between the US
and North Korea. In the end, none of these diplomatic efforts and
agreements has been fully successful, although, in different degrees,
they have helped to delay or constrain – sometimes very significantly –
North Korea’s nuclear weapons efforts (Niksch, 2002). The current
diplomatic effort involves a fourth variation – a Six Party multilateral
agreement or perhaps a package of bilateral agreements stitched
together in an overall multilateral framework. As with previous efforts,
the future success or failure of the Six Party Talks is uncertain.
In
crafting their approaches to the nuclear issue, the US and other powers
have struggled to come to grips with Pyongyang’s ultimate intentions.
For years, North Korea watchers have debated whether Pyongyang views
nuclear weapons as indispensable to the regime’s survival and therefore
non-negotiable, or whether it sees its nuclear assets as a bargaining
chip to be traded away for political and economic benefits necessary to
sustaining the regime. The historical record suggests that the answer is
both, and the emphasis that Pyongyang places on one or the other varies
with domestic conditions and external circumstances (Henneka, 2006). On
the one hand, the time and energy that North Korea has invested in
developing its nuclear weapons capability, allied to its willingness to
repeatedly violate nuclear agreements, strongly suggests that North
Korean leaders deeply believe that some kind of nuclear hedge – or at
least the appearance of a credible nuclear hedge – is essential to
regime survival. Pyongyang sees itself as a besieged and beleaguered
state, surrounded by more powerful enemies, untrustworthy allies, and a
successful southern competitor. To this end, as articulated by Henneka
(2006), if North Korea is ever going to reform itself and survive in the
long run, it must find respite from external pressures and perceived
threats in which case, nuclear weapons are the ultimate defence.
Therefore, as long as outside powers believe that it has a nuclear
deterrent they are – in Pyongyang’s view – more likely to leave North
Korea alone and less likely to pursue hostile policies that could
provoke a confrontation in which such weapons are used. On the other
hand, North Korea has demonstrated that it does respond to international
inducements and pressures to limit its nuclear programme. In the past,
Soviet diplomacy, backed by promises of nuclear power assistance,
persuaded North Korea to join the NPT, and US diplomatic efforts
convinced North Korea to implement IAEA inspections. Later, Washington
and Pyongyang negotiated a complex bilateral agreement that froze North
Korea’s plutonium production facilities and established a process for
the eventual elimination of these facilities. With a combination of
carrots and sticks, Washington has been making enormous diplomatic
efforts to convince Pyongyang to open up a secret underground facility
and to accept a moratorium on long-range missile tests (Niksch, 2002).
Be that as it may, diplomatic efforts in the past have constrained, but
not eliminated North Korea’s nuclear capabilities.
Against the
background of the foregoing, the study critically assesses the US
security policy and North Korean nuclear programme, between 2000 and
2008. The study also examines the US defense policy in terms of the
North Korean nuclear programme jeopardizes US national security as well
as her crusade against international terrorism with the same period.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
Diplomatic
efforts oriented towards grappling with the attempts by North Korean
government to acquire nuclear weapons and develop its ballistic missile
capabilities have witnessed both success and failure. During this
period, four different approaches have been variously tried. First,
beginning in the 1980s, the US-led efforts to use pressures and
inducements to convince North Korea to adhere to the 1968 Treaty on the
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on the one hand, and accept
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection of its nuclear
facilities and materials, on the other. In December 1985, North Korea
acceded to the NPT and, after significant prevarication, accepted
international inspections in April 1992. The implementation of the
inspection agreement however collapsed following North Korean government
refusal to cooperate with the IAEA to verify plutonium production prior
to 1992, a situation compounded when Pyongyang threatened to withdraw
from the NPT in March 1993.
Second, in December 1991, North and South
Korea entered into a bilateral agreement on ‘denuclearisation’ which
included restrictions on nuclear activities beyond those specified in
the NPT. Unfortunately, this agreement was not implemented as a result
of disagreements between Seoul and Pyongyang over the number and type of
bilateral inspections necessary to verify it.
Third, consequent upon
threat by North Korean government to pull out from the NPT in March
1993, the US and North Korea in October 1994 concluded a bilateral
agreement: the Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework called for an
ambitious undertaking to freeze and eventually dismantle North Korea’s
plutonium production facilities and account for its plutonium stocks in
exchange for interim supplies of heavy fuel oil and an alternative
nuclear energy project, as well as improved bilateral relations with
Washington. For nearly a decade, the Agreed Framework halted North
Korean production of additional plutonium, but it did not end North
Korea’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the Agreed
Framework collapsed amid diplomatic acrimony arising from public
revelations in October 2002 that North Korea was pursuing a secret
programme to produce weapons grade uranium. North Korea however revived
its plutonium production facilities in December 2002 and withdrew from
the NPT in January 2003, arguing that it had already given the requisite
90-day notice when it announced its original intent to withdraw in
March 1993.
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ABSRACT - [ Total Page(s): 1 ]This study examines the interface between the US security policy and North Korea nuclear programme. The thrust of the study however is to find out if the US government perceived North Korea nuclear programme as a threat to its national security on the one hand and part of its war on terror, between 2000 and 2008 on the other. The study also investigated whether the US government security policy on North Korea nuclear programme relegates multilateral intervention on nuclear weapon development wit ... Continue reading---
