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The Us Security Policy And North Korea Nuclear Programme, 2000 – 2008
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Finally, the US has, since the collapse of the Agreed
Framework, promoted a fourth effort to deal with the North Korean
nuclear issue – through Six Party Talks between the US, Russia, China,
Japan, and North and South Korea. These are intended to secure a
multilateral agreement for North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons
programme in exchange for security assurances and political and economic
benefits. This is in line with the present US national security
strategy which states that “the US may not deter the types of threats
that are emerging today, such as those created by rogue nations or
terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction†(Woolf, 2008: 9-10).
Consequently, the US government has sought to preempt these threats
through persuasive diplomacy, and attacking the adversaries before they
can attack the US, its allies and interests.
The link between the US
national security policy and North Korean nuclear programmes has been a
subject of intellectual discourse and considerable efforts have been
made by scholars such as Niksch (2002), Henneka (2006), Boureston and
Russell (2009), Niksch (2006), Chanlett-Avery (2012), Pritchard (2005),
Ur-Reham (2010) and so on to examine the threats of North Korean nuclear
programmes to the US national interests/security. Despite the forgoing
inquiries, the extant literature has suffered from important
shortcomings. This is because the existing research in this area has not
satisfactorily explained whether the US government perceives North
Korea Nuclear Programme as a threat to its national security. Of much
importance, however, is the fact that the existing inquiries have failed
short of evaluating adequately whether the US government perceive North
Korea Nuclear Programme as part of its war on terror. Finally, adequate
attempts have not been made to explore the link between the US
government security policy on North Korea Nuclear Programme and
multilateral intervention on nuclear weapon development.
In the light
of the above, attempt is made, therefore, to critically examine the US
national security policy and North Korean nuclear programmes, between
2000 and 2008 in context of the understated research questions:
Did the US government perceive North Korea Nuclear Programme as a threat to its national security, between 2000 and 2008?
Did the US government perceive North Korea Nuclear Programme as part of its war on terror, between 2000 and 2008?
Did
the US government security policy on North Korea nuclear programme
relegate multilateral intervention on nuclear weapon development,
between 2000 and 2008?
1.3 Objectives of the Study
The broad
objective of this study is to critically examine the interface between
the US security policy and North Korea nuclear programme. However, the
study is set to achieve the following specific objectives:
To examine
whether the US government perceives North Korea nuclear programme as a
threat to its national security, between 2000 and 2008.
To ascertain
whether the US government perceives North Korea nuclear programme as
part of its war on terror, between 2000 and 2008.
To investigate if
the US government security policy on North Korea nuclear programme
relegates multilateral intervention on nuclear weapon development,
between 2000 and 2008.
1.4 Significance of the Study
This research
work has both theoretical and practical significance. Theoretically,
the study interrogates the link between the North Korea nuclear
programme and threat to the national security; between the North Korea
nuclear programme and the US government war on terror; and between the
US government security policy on North Korea nuclear programme and
multilateral intervention on nuclear weapon development.
Practically,
the study will be of interest and immense importance to the Nigerian
government, the organs of the United Nations and other people, groups
and organizations interested in American hegemony and unilateralism in
this 21stcentury. The issues will not only help to enhance understanding
of American defense and foreign policy in the 21st century, but will
also provide valuable information/data that will assist global actors in
articulating potent policies that will help to address the US
government -North Korean government face-off over nuclear programme.
Again,
by examining, in its entirety, the North Korea nuclear programme, the
study will constructively highlight how it poses a threat to the US
government national security on the one hand and how the US government
security policy on North Korea nuclear programme relegates multilateral
intervention on nuclear weapon development on the other.
Finally, the
study by addressing the research questions, clarifying issues,
facilitating understanding and stimulating enlightened intellectual
discourse will not only be a further contribution to knowledge and a
source for further research but will equally chart a new intellectual
course in the study of US hegemony and unilateralism in this 21st
century.
1.5 Literature Review
The thrust of this review is to
ascertain how writers have tried to explain the link between the
following: North Korea nuclear programme and threat to the US national
security; North Korea nuclear programme and the US government war on
terror; and US government security policy on North Korea nuclear
programme and multilateral intervention on nuclear weapon development.
This is with a view to locating the gaps in the literature. The
implication of this, therefore, is that our research questions will
generally guide the review.
Did the US government perceive North Korea nuclear programme as a threat to its national security, between 2000 and 2008?
There
is no doubt that scholars have oriented their intellectual energies
towards explaining the US national security and the North Korean nuclear
programme. To this end, Intriligator (2003) maintained that the
national Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) places major
emphasis on preemption and calls for it rather than deterrence as the
fundamental basis of national security, such policy, of course, is a
violation of the UN system that was set up in large part to prevent
precisely such preemption. According to the writer, the United Nations
forbids a member state from taking military action against another
member state unless it has itself been attacked or it has the sanctions
of the Security Council. To this end, the writer contends that the US
violation of international law in its attack on Iraq was as much a
violation as Saddam Hussein was in his attack on Kuwait. Again, the
writer fails to provide specific sections of international law or UN
Charter that uphold that preemption amounts to violation of law.
In
the view of Niksch (2002), North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has
been an immediate foreign policy issue facing the United States because
of North Korea’s refusal to carry out its obligations under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other nuclear accords it had signed.
According to the writer, North Korea has constructed nuclear reactors
and a plutonium reprocessing plant at a site called Yongbyon. U.S. and
other foreign intelligence assessments have concluded that North Korea
probably has acquired enough weapons-grade plutonium for the manufacture
of at least one nuclear weapon. The United States and North Korea
signed an agreement on October 21, 1994, that offers North Korea a
package of benefits in return for a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear
program. Benefits to North Korea include: light water nuclear reactors
totaling 2,000 electric megawatts; shipments of “heavy oil†to North
Korea. However, the pace of implementation of the Agreed Framework has
been very slow, according to the writer, and instead of the original
target date of 2003, it is estimated that completion of the light water
reactors will not take place until well beyond 2010. The United States
has faced several policy problems since the signing of the Agreed
Framework, including securing money annually to finance heavy oil
shipments to North Korea, suspicions of clandestine North Korean nuclear
activities, and North Korea’s development of long range missiles.
Similarly,
Wirtz and Russel (2003) have noted that the Bush administration
developed new guidelines to govern the use of force in combating
emerging terrorist adversaries or “terrorist states.†The writers
maintained that by advocating preventive war and preemption, especially
as a possible response to Iraq’s failure to fulfill its obligations
under UN Security Council resolutions to eliminate its nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons and associated infrastructure following
the Gulf War, the Bush administration is generally depicted if not
being on the wrong side of international law, then pushing the limits of
what is generally considered to be constructive international behavior.
To the duo, the apparent effort to legitimize preventive war and
preemption is often depicted as creating an intolerable precedent when
it comes to other enduring conflicts. They, therefore, concluded by
wondering whether the Bush administration decision to undertake
preventive war would shape the overall tenor of international relations.
That is, whether it would signal a new respect for international law,
or just a growing reliance on the use of force in world politics.
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ABSRACT - [ Total Page(s): 1 ]This study examines the interface between the US security policy and North Korea nuclear programme. The thrust of the study however is to find out if the US government perceived North Korea nuclear programme as a threat to its national security on the one hand and part of its war on terror, between 2000 and 2008 on the other. The study also investigated whether the US government security policy on North Korea nuclear programme relegates multilateral intervention on nuclear weapon development wit ... Continue reading---
