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The Us Security Policy And North Korea Nuclear Programme, 2000 – 2008
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In a
similar vein, Thomas (2004) criticizes America for preferring “to
conduct massive bombing campaigns against other states without much fear
of casualties to American forces.†He therefore, contends that the
United States has done this time and time again, despite the necessity
of it, the justness of the cause, or the civilian casualties incurred.
He states that “Washington wants other states to trust its noble
intentions, but the record of U.S. military interventions in Vietnam,
Iraq, Panama, Afghanistan, and other places would give rise to doubts.â€
In addition to the suspicions many in the global theater have developed
concerning America’s benevolent intentions, the writer also believes
that there is also a growing awareness of its insensitivity to other
cultures and
values.
In line with the foregoing contention, Galston (2002) upholds that the
invasion of Iraq based on the new Bush doctrine of preemption meant not
only the most fateful deployments of American power since World War II,
but also an end to the system of international institutions, laws and
norms that Americans have worked to build for more than half a century.
To this effect, the writer believes that this revolution in
international doctrine is justified and wise. For the writer, rather
than continuing to serve as first among equals in the postwar
international system, the United States has acted as a law unto itself,
creating new rules of international engagement without the consent of
other nations. In his judgment therefore, this new stance would ill
serve the long-term interests of the United States. In the first place,
the United States is a signatory to (indeed, the principal drafter of)
the United Nations Charter, which explicitly reserves to sovereign
nations the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, but
only in the event of armed attack. Unless the administration
establishes Iraqi complicity in the terrorism of 9-11, it cannot invoke
self-defense, as defined by the charter, as the justification for
attacking Iraq. Furthermore, the writer insists that the broader
structure of international law creates additional obstacles to an
invasion of Iraq. Though such law contains a doctrine of “anticipatory
self-defense,†there must be shown a necessity of self-defense, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation. In this regard, the concept of anticipatory self-defense
was too narrow to support an attack on Iraq: The threat to the United
States from Iraq is not sufficiently specific, clearly enough
established or shown to be imminent, the writer contends. In sum, he
avers that with preemptive war in Iraq, the Bush administration has
shifted its focus from stateless foes to state-based adversaries, and
from terrorism in the precise sense to the possession of weapons of mass
destruction. Each constitutes a threat. But they are not the same
threat and do not warrant the same response. It serves no useful purpose
to pretend that they are seamlessly connected, let alone one and the
same, be
believes.
In another development, Niksch (2006) maintained that North Korea’s
decisions at the end of 2002 to restart nuclear installations at
Yongbyon that were shut down under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed
Framework of 1994 and to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), and its multiple missile tests of July 4, 2006, create a
foreign policy problem for the United States. Restarting the Yongbyon
facilities opens up a possible North Korean intent to stage a “nuclear
breakout†of its nuclear program and openly produce nuclear weapons.
North Korea has also threatened to test a nuclear weapon. North Korea’s
actions follow the disclosure in October 2002 that it is operating a
secret nuclear program based on uranium enrichment and the decision by
the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) in November
2002 to suspend shipments of heavy oil to North Korea. North Korea
claims that it has nuclear weapons and that it has completed
reprocessing of over 8,000 nuclear fuel rods. To this the U.S. officials
and other experts state that North Korea probably had reprocessed most
or all of the fuel rods and may have produced enough plutonium for 6-10
atomic bombs. The main objective of the Bush Administration, according
to the writer, was to secure the dismantling of North Korea’s plutonium
and uranium-based nuclear programs. Its strategy included :(1)
terminating the Agreed Framework; (2) withholding U.S. reciprocal
measures until North Korea takes steps to dismantle its nuclear
programs; (3) assembling an international coalition, through six party
negotiations, to apply diplomatic and economic pressure on North Korea;
and (4) imposing financial sanctions on foreign banks that facilitate
North Korea’s illegal counterfeiting activities. China, South Korea, and
Russia criticized the Bush Administration for not negotiating directly
with North Korea, and they also voiced opposition to economic sanctions
and to the potential use of force against Pyongyang. China, Russia, and
South Korea increasingly have expressed support for North Korea’s
position in six-party talks. The talks have made little progress. As
also articulated by the writer, North Korea, in the six party meetings
of July- September 2005, widened the gap between the U.S. and North
Korean positions when it asserted that it would not dismantle or even
disclose its nuclear programs until light water reactors were physically
constructed in North Korea. The widening gap was not narrowed by a
statement of the six parties on September 19, 2005, in which North Korea
agreed to rejoin the NPT and its 1992 safeguards agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency “at an early date†but which also
contained a reference to North Korea’s right to have a light water
reactor, the writer concluded.
Again, Finstad (nd) contends that it
makes more sense to define preemption as striking a potential adversary
before it can become a nuclear power, rather than striking an enemy
before it can strike you. According to him, China and Russia are more
threatening to the US than the entire “axis of evil†combined, but, as
nuclear powers, it would be unthinkable for the US to launch a first
strike (or preemption) on either nation the way it did to Iraq.
Furthermore, the writer insists that the re-definition of the preemption
doctrine is most significant in the way that it impacts the incentive
structure of nations at odds with US foreign policy. For him, analysis
of actions and statements made by Iran and North Korea show that these
countries are acting rationally from within this structure: Having
already developed atomic bombs and viable delivery systems, North Korea
believes that bold statements of its willingness to use these weapons
will deter an American attack. Conversely, Iran realizes that it must
not make its ongoing pursuit of nukes public, but believes it is not
only essential to Iran’s security to continue developing its nuclear
program, but the programme will also serves sound deterrent against
American invasion. In sum the writer argues that these recent actions by
Iran and North Korea further demonstrate that the Bush administration’s
preemption doctrine in Iraq was not a deterrent at all. The
implication is that countries that find themselves at odds with the
interests of the United States feel threatened by the example of Iraq,
and are encouraged to develop nukes by the example of North Korea.
Smaller countries with fewer resources to foster nuclear research, such
as Libya, may be intimidated into scrapping their programs. Larger,
wealthier, more threatening nations, however, are simply encouraged to
build nuclear bombs, and to make their willingness to use them known to
the world.
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ABSRACT - [ Total Page(s): 1 ]This study examines the interface between the US security policy and North Korea nuclear programme. The thrust of the study however is to find out if the US government perceived North Korea nuclear programme as a threat to its national security on the one hand and part of its war on terror, between 2000 and 2008 on the other. The study also investigated whether the US government security policy on North Korea nuclear programme relegates multilateral intervention on nuclear weapon development wit ... Continue reading---
