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The Us Security Policy And North Korea Nuclear Programme, 2000 – 2008
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In a similar argument, Eliot (2003) insists that while concern about
peaceful strategies for the 21st century is essential, it is more
crucial to attempt stopping this very risky war and lowering the Bush
administration’s bellicose rhetoric (and exorbitant military budget)
that is escalating tensions and dangers across the globe. As for the
writer, the Bush administration’s paranoia and militaristic belligerence
has erased much of the sympathy people around the globe felt toward
America after September 11th, and has escalated tensions and dangers
throughout the planet. Furthermore, the writer avers that the terrible
risks inherent in pre-emptive war-the potential deaths of thousands of
innocent Iraqis, the danger to U.S. troops, the likely rise in terrorist
recruitment, the long-term environmental degradation of the region
through oil fires and depleted uranium, and the temptation to move on to
the next war and the next generation of dangerous weaponry simply
cannot be justified by any of the reasons offered by the Bush
administration. Instead of brainstorming justifications and military
strategies for a pre-emptive war, the writer believes that it would be
nice if the Bush administration would devote its creativities to
thinking about non-war alternatives.
Did the US government security
policy on North Korea nuclear programme relegate multilateral
intervention on nuclear weapon development, between 2000 and 2008?
In
this final segment of the literature review, our concern is to find out
whether the US government security policy on North Korea nuclear
programme relegates multilateral intervention on nuclear weapon
development. To this end, Pritchard (2005) averred that the lack of a
permanent multilateral structure for security dialogue in North-East
Asia and the lack of a successful precedent involving the DPRK in
multilateral talks contribute to the likelihood that this iteration of
multilateral talks may well fail. The period of time between sessions of
the Six-Party Talks and the lack of progress suggest that there is
insufficient common ground or commitment by the key participants (the
United States and the DPRK) for resolution of the crisis in the
foreseeable future. In the face of likely failure of the multilateral
process currently underway, it would seem prudent for the participants
to review the substantial track record of DPRK participation and
accommodation in bilateral negotiations with both the United States and
the Republic of Korea and modify the Six-Party Talks accordingly. One
way to do this, according to the writer, would be for the United States
to enter into a serious and sustained bilateral dialogue with Pyongyang
as a complementary component of the six-party process. In this scenario,
as the United States begins to shape what may ultimately result in a
resolution to the crisis in its complementary negotiations with North
Korea under the auspices of the six-party process, it would continue to
consult with its close allies South Korea and Japan. Washington’s
coordinated policy approach to North Korea would be enhanced by Tokyo
and Seoul’s own bilateral meetings with Pyongyang. This two-pronged
approach has the best chance of forging a near-term negotiated
settlement through an extensive and mutually supportive bilateral
component and the best chance to ensure its implementation through a
multilateral component of guarantees and monitoring. Given the track
record of the past two years, the prognosis for successful resolution of
the nuclear crisis through the current framework of multilateral talks
is not very bright, the writer concluded.
Ur-Reham (2010) reviewed
the prospects for Korean reunification in view of the policies and
actions of the governments of the two Koreas. The writer examined the
roles played by china, Japan and Russia, as their policies directly
affect any long term political solution and ongoing humanitarian
concerns on the Korean Peninsula. The writer equally discussed President
Kim Dae-jung’s ‘sunshine policy’ in the late 1990s, a policy of
engagement which revived hopes for Korean reunification. Those hopes
suffered serious setbacks following North Korea’s nuclear tests in 2006
and 2009. Also, in 1998, there was a radical shift in South Korea’s
policy towards North Korea with the election of Lee Myung-bak’s
conservative administration which tied aid to denuclearization. The
renewed talk of contingencies’ and succession struggle’ in North Korea
in the wake of Kim Jong-il’s reported stroke in August 2008 has also
been vitiating inter-Korean relations. Conflicting US and China policies
on North Korea is another factor that has bedeviled reunification. To
this effect, the writer argued that Korean reunification could best take
place through sustained engagement and peaceful means. An important
facet is the creation of the right environment for achieving the goal of
reunification and denuclearization, a daunting task, particularly
before the implementation of at least one of the international
commitments made, such as the 2000 and 2007 South-North Summit
Declarations of the 1994 Agreed Framework between the US and North
Korea; or the lifting of international sanctions on North Korea, the
writer concluded.
Contributing, Wampler (2003) maintained that North
Korea’s nuclear weapons program has moved back to the front pages with
the unprecedented acknowledgement by North Korea that it has developed
nuclear weapons. According to the writer, news of this revelation came
as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs James A. Kelly
was preparing to leave Beijing for consultations in Seoul. To the
writer, this was but the latest step in a simmering crisis that began
with the admission by North Korea, after being confronted with hard
evidence by Assistant Secretary Kelly in October 2002, that it has been
pursuing in secret a nuclear weapons program in violation of the Agreed
Framework of 1994 and its adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). Pyongyang’s subsequent actions in asserting the right to possess
nuclear weapons, breaking the seals on its nuclear reactor put there by
the International Atomic Energy Agency, withdrawing from the NPT and the
expulsion of IAEA inspectors from the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, have
kept the crisis simmering, and laid the basis for reported splits
within the Bush administration over the best strategy for dealing with
Pyongyang. Seemingly replaying debates marking the lead-up to the war
with Iraq, newspaper analyses portray the State Department under
Secretary of State Colin Powell pressing for diplomacy and efforts to
reassure the North Koreans that the U.S. was not seeking regime change.
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ABSRACT - [ Total Page(s): 1 ]This study examines the interface between the US security policy and North Korea nuclear programme. The thrust of the study however is to find out if the US government perceived North Korea nuclear programme as a threat to its national security on the one hand and part of its war on terror, between 2000 and 2008 on the other. The study also investigated whether the US government security policy on North Korea nuclear programme relegates multilateral intervention on nuclear weapon development wit ... Continue reading---
