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A Critique Of Popper’s Strategy For The Growth Of Science
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Since Bacon, the most widely
held view was that science was characterized by its observational basis
while pseudo-sciences and metaphysics were typified by their speculative
method. Popper hardly accepts this view. The modern theories of physics
especially Einstein’s theories were highly speculative and abstract.
They were very far removed from what might be tagged their observational
bases. All attempts to show the contrary were unconvincing, Popper
concluded.15 Most scientific theories originate from myths. The
Copernican system, for instance, was precipitated from a Neo-Platonic
worship of light of the Sun who occupied the pride of place- the center
because of his nobility. Copernicus, it must be noted studied in
Bologna, under the Platonist Novara.16 Atomisms, corpuscular theory of
light among others, are myths that have in no less a measure become
vital for physical sciences. It makes no meaning to say, Popper noted,
that these theories in one stage of their development were nonsensical
expressions while they suddenly become meaningful in another.17
Parmenides of Elea seems to have captured this sequence when he opined
that out of non-being comes non-being. No ‘sense’ can ever emerge from
‘non-sense’!
Furthermore, it is obvious that a lot of realities which
science posits are no more observable than metaphysical entities.
Should we have to talk about gravity, and various forms of forces,
Newtonian mass points—Popper calls these ‘occult metaphysical
substances’18 to depict their non-observable nature. Can we also observe
time and space which have among others formed the fundamentals of
scientific knowledge? Thus, if following the Positivists, we exclude
these from all things meaningful, scientific boat would automatically be
rocked and shattered.
We have seen that the broom of the
anti-metaphysicist sweeps away too much. The anti-metaphysicist’s
assertion that metaphysical propositions are sheer gibberish, if a
little protracted, throws science into the wilderness of devastation. No
wonder Popper had first to expose the antiques of this position with
regard to science, for his maps for the growth of science would be
irrelevant if the said science has been utterly extinguished.
1.3 POPPER SETS OFF AGENDA FOR THE THEORY-DEPENDENCE OF SCIENCE
Popper
is not in the least undaunted in his conviction that the advance of
science can hardly result from the accumulation of perceptual
experiences in the course of time. No matter how dogged we are in
gathering and sorting them, it is impossible, he thought, for science to
emerge out of uninterpreted sense-perceptions. The canon of selection
is ever utilized in the scientific observations. Hence, before any
meaningful observation can be embarked upon, there is need for a choice
of object, definite task—all of which presuppose interests, problems and
points of view.19 In the light of this, all observations involve
interpretation. Pure, unadulterated observational knowledge ‘would, if
at all possible be utterly barren and futile.’20 Chalmers seems to
share this view when he asserts:
How can we establish significant
facts about the world through observation if we do not have some
guidance as to what kind of knowledge we are seeking or what problems we
are trying to solve?
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