• A Critique Of David Hume Empiricism

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    • 1.6   METHODOLOGY
      The method to be adopted in this work is that of critical study. As the work is on David Hume’s empiricism, the method will therefore be, first of all to present a general overview of empiricism. After this we will then narrow our attention down to Hume’s notion of the subject matter empiricism. It will be after presenting these that we will therefore settle down to criticize.
      For the purpose of convenience however, our criticism is going to be in two phases.  The first phase will be to provide the attacks which had been leveled against Hume’s empiricism by other people, this is because we are quite aware that Hume’s empiricism has come under attacks over the years.
      The second phase of the criticism will therefore be our own criticism. We will here point out as will be able, some of those problems Hume’s empiricism are shrouded with due to Hume’s radical position, and based on these, we will therefore draw our criticisms against his empiricism.
      1.7   LITERATURE REVIEW
      Our aim here is to provide the reader with the knowledge of some of the texts used in this work. But first of all, David Hume’s book constitute primary literature.
      In his book, “An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding” edited by Eric Steinberg and published by Hacket Publishing Company, Indianapolis in 1977,4 David Hume was bent on demonstrating that an enquiry, the objects of human reason will be discovered to include only relations of ideas and matters of fact. These are only two categories under which any knowledge that is certain can be placed. All issues dealing with numbers are intuitively certain and therefore under “relations of ideas” where anything discoverable by experience is under “matters of fact”.
      Also, in another book, “David Hume and problem of reason; recovering – the human sciences” (published by Yale University Press in 1990)5, John Danford explained how skepticism concerning the ability of reason to lead to knowledge acquisition led to Hume’s position was to show that when reason is cut loose or severed from experience, it can only generate irresolution and confusion.
      In the book, A Critical Account of the philosophy of Kant, published by James Maclehose in 1876,6 we see Edward. Caird showing Hume claims about the passivity of the mind in knowledge acquisition on through the ”association of ideas”. Here the mind is shown as not actively dealing with given materials to come up with knowledge but as finding already in the very data of sensation certain natural relations or associative principle by virtue of which one idea calls up another and therefore present a clear picture of something to the mind.
      END NOTES
      David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, edited by Eric Steinberg, (Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing Co. 1977), p. 112.
      Ibid pg. 114.
      Pentaleon Iroegbu, Metaphysics: The Kpim of Philosophy, (Owerri): International Universities Press, 1995), p. 179.
      Op Cit.
      John W. Danford, David Hume and the Problem of Reason; Recovering the Human Sciences (New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 1990) p. 85.
      Edward Caird M.A, A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant (Glosgow: James Maclehose 1877), pp. 67-68.
  • CHAPTER ONE -- [Total Page(s) 4]

    Page 4 of 4

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