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A Critique Of Wiredu’s Concept Of Truth
CHAPTER ONE -- [Total Page(s) 7]
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The main recommendation of this theory, according to him, lies in the
fact that it does take of aid does not conflict with many millions of
the most obvious fact of truth. One such obvious fact, for instance, is
that the belief by my friend that I have gone away on holidays certainly
will be true, if and only if, I actually have gone away. Hence, the
necessary and sufficient condition for a belief to be true is imply
this: “That is should correspond to factâ€.15 This is truth in the
secondary sense . Moore is quick to point out that it is propositions
rather than acts of belief which are true of false in the primary
sense.16 take often say that belief are truth of false, but this is only
because the word “Belief†is often used not for an act of believing but
for what is believed.
There is also a Russialian Version
of the correspondence theory of truth. Starting with the notion of
belief Russell argues that the truth or falsity of a belief always
depend upon something which lies outsides the believe itself. And this
leads us to adopt the view that “truth consists in some form of
correspondence between belief and factâ€. 17
The problem, however
inherent in this theory is that if truth consists in a correspondence of
thought with something outside thought then thought can never know when
truth is attained.
This apparent difficulty led to
concerted efforts among some philosophers to attempt and find some
definition of truth, which shall not, consists in relation to something
wholly outside belief. The most important attempt at a definition of
this sort if the theory that truth consists in ‘coherence’. But Russell
makes it a critique of this theory and settles down to defend the
correspondence theory.
According to Ressell, there is a
great difficulty in the view of coherence. There is no reason to suppose
that only one coherent body of belief is possible. Hence, we are driven
back to correspondence with fact as constituting the nature of truth.
Russell opines that we have to seek a theory of truth which allows
truth to have an opposite, namely, false hood, makes a property of
beliefs but s a property wholly dependent upon the relation of the
beliefs to outside things.
In every act of belief, there is
a mind, which believes, and then is forms concerning which is believes.
Whenever a relation holds between two or more for ms, the mind unites
the terms into a complex whole. Now, a belief in Russell view is true
when it corresponds to a certain associated complex, and false when it
does not. The condition of the truth or a belief in something not
involving beliefs or, in generals, any mind at all but only the objects
of the belief.
A mind, which believes, believes truly
involving the mind. Buts only its objects this correspondence ensures
truth and wits absence entails false hood.
CHAPTER ONE -- [Total Page(s) 7]
Page 3 of 7
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