-
Electoral Processes And National Security
CHAPTER ONE -- [Total Page(s) 4]
Page 2 of 4
-
-
-
Following the announcement of the result of the 2011 Presidential
election which saw to the re-election of the incumbent, Goodluck
Jonathan candidate for the ruling People’s Democratic Party, violence
began with widespread protests by the supporters of the main opposition
candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, Congress for Progressive Change (CPC)
challenging the results. The protest generated into sectarian violence
and killings by the Almajiri (Sanghaya School Students) in the Northern
States of Bauchi, Adamawa, Bornu, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Katsina,
Nigeri, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara. Relief official estimates that more
than 65,000 people were displaced while over 800 people were estimated
to have lost their live.
In a bid to forestall future
occurrence, two commissions were established in May, 2011 following the
elections, to examine the factors that led to the insecurity issues.
Governor Patrick Ibrahim Yakowa established a twelve man commission in
Kaduna, and nationally, President Jonathan established a 22 person
commission headed by Sheikh Ahmed Lemu. The commission’s work was to
identify the root causes of the violence, and even identify the
perpetrators for possible punishment. But the tracks of past
commissions suggested that neither effort will make any headway as the
2015 Presidential elections also surface with its sad parts though not
as horrible as that of the 2011 presidential elections.
The
2015 General elections was the fifth to be conducted by INEC in the
country’s forth republic. As part of preparations, INEC developed a
timetable and schedule of activities for the conduct of the elections.
Unlike in the past were elections were staggered in such a way that the
Presidential election was usually conducted last, the timetable for the
2015 general elections showed that the presidential and National
Assembly elections were paired to hold on February 14, 2015 while the
governorship and state houses of assembly elections were to follow on
February 28, 2015.
However, insurgency by the Boko Haram
sect in the north-eastern part of the country, which had been on since
2009, necessitated a change in the election timetable at the last
minute. INEC consequently postponed the elections by six weeks
(Suleiman, 2015). This meant that the Presidential and National
Assembly elections were rescheduled for March 28, and the governorship
and state Houses of Assembly elections for April 11, 2005. Similarly,
unlike previous elections in the country, INEC introduced the use of
permanent voters cards (PVC) containing the biometric details and
embossed passport photograph of voters, and smart card readers to verify
the authenticity of PVCs presented by voters. The introduction of both
items by INEC was aimed at checking multiple voter registration, as
only one card was issued to each registered voter, and to prevent
multiple voting. This was intended to ensure the integrity of the
elections.
Other arrangement for the election was the adoption of the
“Remodified Open Secret Ballot System (REMOBS). In the system, voters
were to thumb/finger-print on the ballot for the candidates of their
choice in secret and cast their votes in open (INEC 2015:8).
The 2015 elections were actually symbolic in Nigeria’s political
history as it marked the first time the opposition party successfully
dislodged the incumbent party from power at the federal level
particularly in a less controversial and peaceful process. Clearly,
this interesting development is in contrary to the gloomy picture
presented by many analysts in previous elections. The country
experienced for the first time in its post-democratic transition
history, the emergence of a strong opposition party which had the
capacity to displace the incumbent party. This was against all odds, as
the election was staged in an environment of raging terrorists violence
in the north-eastern part of the country which was not only a major
risk to voting, but also possibly affected the electoral chances of the
main opposition party, and could result in post-election violence.
Also, there was growing public perception of poor preparation by the
Electoral Management Body (EMB) and the INEC following problems
experienced in the voters registration process which influenced beliefs
that the election might be another charade. The electoral process was
characterized by a heated campaign process which was anchored on ethnic
and religious sloganeering which did not only divide the potential
voters along religious and ethnic lines, but also potentially prepared
the grounds for another ethno-religious violence.
The
conduct of the security agencies indicated bias for the ruling party
which increasingly generated fear for the opposition and electorate
about electoral security and electoral fraud. The sudden postponement
of the elections for six weeks (February 14 to March 28) also increased
public distrust of the electoral process (see international crisis
group, 2015; Onapajo, 2015).
The study therefore aims at a
comparative analysis of the 2011 and 2015 Presidential elections in
Nigeria with sole objective of comparing the conduct of the elections as
well as the nature of electoral security using its indicators which are
divided into three phases-pre-election period, election period, and the
post-election period.
CHAPTER ONE -- [Total Page(s) 4]
Page 2 of 4
-
-
ABSRACT - [ Total Page(s): 1 ]This paper examined electoral processes and security challenges in Nigeria with specific reference to the 2011 and 2015 presidential elections. The data for this study were drawn mostly from secondary sources. Systematically, the paper reviewed the conceptions of electoral violence, perspectives on election related violence and security of lives and properties in Nigeria. The major findings of this study reveal that from the 1950s, elections in Nigeria approximated a war that is often waged to ... Continue reading---
